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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee, :
v

;

GARY L. STARNES

:

Case No. 920096-CA
Priority 2

Defendant/Appellant.:
EPirF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE 01 PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a restitution judgment in the
Fifth Judicial District Court A\ ;>.,- *. ; Washington County, State
r.f Utah, the Honorable Jam^
has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
".. - presented on appeal i
court's decision to accept
defendant's proposed testimonial evidence by proffer, instead of
a 11 ow i
either

.

:!i it' s M :i ti lesses t "+raestify " ] :i v e," dei ly defendant

constitutional right ^ • due process or his right to a

full hearing on the issue of restitution as required under Utah
Code
interpretation

0) i" These •

!

ie

constitutional and statutory provisions.

Consequently, both present questions of law that are reviewed

1

under a correction of error standard.

State v. Mitchell, 824

P.2d 469, 471 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Swapp, 808 P.2d 115, 120
(Utah App. 1991).
2.

Did the trial court properly impose restitution?

The decision of whether to impose restitution lies within the
solid discretion of the trial court.

State v. Haston, 811 P.2d

929, 936 (Utah App. 1991), cert, granted,

P.2d

(Utah

1992); State v. Snvder, 747 P.2d 417, 420 (Utah 1987).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
The pertinent constitutional provisions, statutes and
rules are set forth in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with criminal mischief, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (1990),
assault, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-102 (1990), and criminal trespass, also a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206(2)(a)(i)
(R. 5-6). The information was later amended, and defendant was
charged with criminal mischief, a class A misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (1990), assault, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1990),
and criminal trespass, also a class B misdemeanor, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206(2)(a)(i) (R. 10-11).

On January 7,

1991, defendant pled guilty to the first two charges, and the
criminal trespass charge was dismissed.

The trial court

sentenced defendant to one year of probation, ordered defendant
2

to pay fines totaling $600.00/ and retained jurisdiction on the
question of restitution for the victim (R. 2 ) .
On August 7 r 19 91, the State filed a motion for
restitution judgment on behalf of the victim (R. 1 6 ) . Notice of
a hearing on the motion was served .-i! d"i|:o,n'1 jrii.'" s pilaee of
business

'F

was held

iQ), am1, on August 30, 1991,
55 at

appeared -

restitution hearing

Neither defendant nor his counsel

1M :

, and the Uric *

restitution judgment against defendant

. ' entei'erll a
the amount of $281.89,

the amount of actual damages itemized by the victim (R. 18, 21;

By October 29, 1991, defendant had made no effort to
make restitution, and the State filed a motion for an order to
show cause (R

22) .

The coi in t: Issued tl i,e order, and set a

hearing for November 8, 199 3 (R. 2 3 ) . Defendant was personally
served and ordered *

appear at that hearing

(R. 2 4 ) . The

hearing was held c - scheduled, and defendant appeared without
counsel (R. 5 7 at

#.

Defendant explained that he d id not know

about the original restitution hearing because hv
Illinois for several months (R.

h<ui been in

He further

challenged the amount of restitution ordered and requested
another restitution hearinc
original restitution order
1991 (R

.earing for November 13,

45, 57 at 7)
At: Hit/'1 ip'lovembei M ,

i^lfl hi-jai, i nq, Merendanr. again

appeared without counsel and explained that his attorney was

3

engaged in a trial in Salt Lake City (R. 56 at 3-5). Although no
appearance of counsel had been filed, defendant moved for a
continuance on the basis of his counsel's inability to attend the
hearing (R. 45, R. 56 at 3-5). Noting that the victim was
present and prepared to testify, the court denied defendant's
motion for a continuance (R, 56 at 5). The court explained to
defendant that it would hear the victim's testimony, allow
defendant to ask questions and would make a ruling on that basis
(R. 56 at 5). However, the court emphasized that it would not
sign any restitution judgment for thirty days so that defendant's
counsel could review transcripts of the hearing and object to the
proposed order if defendant so desired (R. 56 at 5, 14, 18). At
the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that restitution
in the amount of $450.00 was appropriate and again explained that
it would allow defendant's counsel thirty days to object to the
restitution judgment before it was signed by the court (R. 29, 56
at 17-18).
On December 11, 1991, defendant, through his present
counsel, objected to the unsigned restitution judgment and
requested yet another restitution hearing (R. 30-31).

A hearing

was held on January 8, 1992 (R. 58), after which the court
entered its findings on the record and ordered defendant to pay
$450.00 in restitution (R. 44-47; R. 58 at 13-17).

The court's

final restitution judgment was entered on January 16, 1992, and
it is from that order that defendant appeals (R. 44-47, 49). (A

4

copy of the trial court's order is attached hereto as addendum
A.)
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The facts pertinent to the issues presented on appeal
appear in the Statement of the Case and Argument sections of this
brief.1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should reject defendant's claim that the
trial court violated his right to due process and his r4^ht to a
full hearing on the issue of restitution when it decidea to
accept his proposed testimonial evidence by proffer, instead of
allowing defendant's witnesses to testify at the restitution
hearing.

Neither issue was preserved below, and, consequently,

defendant has waived those claims on appeal. Moreover, defendant
has failed to cite any authority to support his assertions.
Finally, even if this Court were to consider the merits of
defendant's claims, the record makes clear that the trial court
afforded defendant ample opportunity to present evidence.
Indeed, the trial court admitted and considered all of
defendant's evidence.
Finally, although the trial court could have more
clearly stated its reasons on the record for imposing
1

Because defendant has not provided a transcript of the
hearing at which his guilty plea was taken, the State is unable
to provide a recitation of the facts underlying defendant's
conviction. However, because defendant challenges only the
restitution judgment, and not his conviction, the record that
defendant has provided on appeal appears to be adequate for a
resolution of the issues raised.

5

restitution, it did provide a sufficient basis for its decision.
Moreover, there is substantial evidence in the record to support
the imposition of restitution, and defendant has not even
asserted that he was prejudiced by the trial court's alleged
failure to comply with the requirements of Utah's restitution
statute.

This Court should therefore affirm the trial court's

restitution judgment.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT SHOULD REFUSE TO ADDRESS
DEFENDANT'S "DUE PROCESS" CLAIMS BECAUSE
DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESERVE THOSE CLAIMS
BELOW# AND HE HAS FAILED TO CITE ANY
AUTHORITY TO SUPPORT HIS ASSERTIONS ON
APPEAL.
This Court should reject defendant's claim that the
trial court violated his due process rights under the state and
federal constitutions when it refused to allow defendant to put
on "live witnesses" instead of accepting the proposed testimony
of defendant's witnesses by proffer.

Br. of Appellant at 8-12.

Defendant, in essence, asserts that because the State was allowed
to have the victim testify "live" at the November 13, 1991
restitution hearing, defendant was denied his right to due
process when the court accepted defendant's proposed testimonial
evidence by proffer at the January 8, 1992 hearing instead of
allowing defendant's witnesses to testify "live" for purposes of
"persuasion."

Br. of Appellant at 10. As demonstrated below,

defendant never objected to the trial court's decision to accept
proffered testimony instead of having defendant's witnesses

6

testify.

Defendant's claim was therefore waived.

See State v.

Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 71 n.2 (Utah App. 1990) ("[Utah appellate
courts] normally will not consider issues, even constitutional
ones, that have not been presented first to the trial court for
its consideration and resolution.").
At the January 8, 1992 restitution hearing, defendant's
counsel told the court that he planned to call two witnesses who
would testify on the issue of damages suffered by the victim (R.
58 at 11). The trial court requested a proffer, and defense
counsel provided an account of the proposed testimony2 (R. 58 at
11-13).

The trial court accepted the proffer as given (R. 58 at

16), and it made extensive findings from the bench (R. 58 at 1316).

After the trial court held that it would order defendant to

pay $450.00 in restitution, the following exchange occurred
between the court and defense counsel:
THE COURT: Anything else?
MR. BISHOP: Am I understanding that you accept the
proffer as given?
THE COURT: I accept the proffer as given.

2

Defendant's first proposed witness was defendant himself,
who intended to testify that he did not damage any of the
victim's property and that the victim was simply trying to "stick
it to [him]" (R. 58 at 11-12). Defendant's second proposed
witness was Richard Madsen, who would have testified that he went
to the victim's house because he hopec to prevent an altercation.
Madsen also would have testified that although there was a
"scuffle," he restrained defendant and that he observed no damage
to the victim's property (R. 58 at 12-13).
7

MR. BISHOP: May I call the witnesses for purposes of
the persuasiveness of that proffer?
THE COURT: No counsel.
MR. BISHOP: Okay.
THE COURT: Rule 1101 does not give you that privilege
under the circumstances.

That's where we stand.

MR. BISHOP: Okay.
THE COURT: Thank you, gentlemen.
R. 58 at 16-17.
It is clear from the record that defendant never
objected to the court's refusal to allow his witnesses to
testify.

Defendant did not question the basis for the court's

ruling, nor did he challenge the court's ruling on due process
grounds.

Defendant's "due process" claims are therefore waived,

and this Court should not indulge defendant by entertaining his
arguments for the first time on appeal.

See State v. Johnson,.

774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) ("[A]s we have repeatedly stated,
'A general rule of appellate review in criminal cases in Utah is
that a contemporaneous objection or some form of

specific

preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial
court record before an appellate court will review such claim on
appeal.'

Importantly, the grounds for the objection must be

distinctly and specifically stated." (citations omitted)).
Moreover, "a reviewing court is entitled to have the
issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not
simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the

8

burden of argument and research."
450 (Utah 1988).

State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,

Defendant fails to cite any authority in

support of his assertion that if one party is allowed to put on
"live" evidence, due process requires that the other party
likewise be allowed to have witnesses testify live for
"persuasive" purposes.

Defendant also fails to cite any

authority to support his assertion that Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201
(1990) required the trial court to allow his witnesses to testify
instead of accepting that testimonial evidence through proffer.
This Court should therefore reject defendant's claims.

See State

v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984) ("Since defendant
fails to support [his] argument by any legal analysis or
authority, we decline to rule on it.").
Defendant also claims that "[w]hen the initial
restitution order was entered without notice to
Defendant/Appellant, the restitution amount was $281.69, even
though damages found only came to $268.59."
10.

Defendant's claim is misplaced.

Br. of Appellant at

First, notice of the

hearing was mailed to defendant in care of the Black Swan
Restaurant, a business owned by defendant and the address listed
on the arrest warrant for defendant (R. 9, 16-17).

Even

defendant acknowledged that notice of the original hearing was
probably sent to "[his] Utah address," but asserted that he did
not know about the hearing because he was in Illinois (R. 57 at
2-5).

However, defendant never provided the court with a

different address or any notice that he had changed his address

9

(R. 57 at 3). Consequently, defendant's assertion that the
original hearing was held without notice to him is not accurate.
As the trial court recognized, although defendant did not receive
notice, notice was served (R. 44; R. 57 at 4-5). As for
defendant's assertion that the original restitution order was for
$281.69, even though the amount of damages found was only
$268.59, the actual damages itemized for the trial court in the
victim's letter totaled $281.69 (R. 18). While it appears that
the victim may have made an arithmetic error, there is nothing in
the record to suggest that either the victim, the State or the
trial court was aware of the mistake.

Of course, in the final

analysis defendant's complaints are moot because the trial court,
at defendant's request, set aside the original restitution
judgment, and set another restitution hearing (R. 45).
Nevertheless, defendant complains that he was penalized
because "[a]fter [he] attempted to have a restitution hearing,
the amount [of the restitution judgment] jumped [from $281.69] to
$450.00 without any explanation and without any new evidence."
Br. of Appellant at 10. Defendant's assertion is misplaced;
there was new evidence to support the increase in the amount of
restitution ordered.

Specifically, the original restitution

order only covered the cost of repairing several items damaged by
defendant and the value of those items that could not be repaired
(R. 18). However, at the November 13, 1991 restitution hearing,
the victim explained that it was not possible to restore some of
the damaged items, including an antique table and two floor
10

lamps, to their original condition (R. 56 at 7-9). Consequently,
the value of some of the items damaged by defendant was
diminished3, and those losses in value were not reflected in the
original restitution order (R. 18; R. 56 at 7-9). This Court
should therefore rebuff defendant's insinuation that the trial
court penalized him for requesting a restitution hearing.
Even if this Court were inclined to address any of the
assertions made by defendant in points I and II of his brief,
those claims lack merit.

As demonstrated in the Statement of the

Case section of this brief, defendant was given several
opportunities to put on evidence in his favor, and the court did
in fact receive all of defendant's proposed evidence (R. 58 at
11-14).

Moreover, contrary to defendant's assertions, the court

did explain what weight it accorded the evidence presented by
both the State and defendant (R. 58 at 14-16).

Br. of Appellant

at 10.
Finally, defendant's assertion that he was "denied
access to counsel" because he was given only five days notice of
the second restitution hearing and was therefore unable to obtain

3

For instance, the victim paid $1000.00 for the antique
table some fifteen years earlier, and it is likely that the table
had increased in value over that fifteen year period. Although
the table was repaired, it could not be fully restored (R. 56 at
7-9).
The victim also provided a letter from Stephen Roth,
the person who repaired the lamps and table that were broken by
defendant. In that letter, Roth explained that he was unable to
fully restore the damaged items and that the value of the antique
table was "lessoned [sic] considerably by the damage and the
addition of 'modern' repair parts" (Plaintiffs Exhibit #6). (A
copy of Exhibit #6 is attached hereto as Addendum B.)
11

counsel ignores the circumstances of this case.
at 11.

Br. of Appellant

The record makes clear that at the November 8, 1991

hearing on the State's motion for an order to show cause, at
which defendant appeared without counsel, the restitution hearing
was set for November 13, 1991 in order to accommodate defendant's
travel itinerary (R. 57 at 7). Defendant did not complain that
five days was an insufficient amount to time in which to obtain
counsel.

Although defendant's counsel was unable to appear at

the November 13, 1991 hearing and the court elected to hear the
victim's testimony instead of granting defendant's motion for a
continuance, defendant did appear with counsel at the January 8,
1992 hearing.

Counsel indicated at that hearing that he had

reviewed the transcripts from the earlier restitution proceedings
(R. 58 at 3-5, 9-11).

Presumably, if defendant felt the need to

clarify any of the victim's testimony, he would have had the
victim subpoenaed to appear at the January 8, 1992 hearing.
Under the circumstances, defendant's claim that he was denied the
opportunity to obtain counsel lacks merit.4

A

Defendant's second claim on appeal, that he was denied his
right to a full restitution hearing as guaranteed by Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-201(3)(c) (1990), is little more than a regurgitation
of his "due process" claim. For the reasons discussed above,
defendant's "full hearing" claim also should be rejected by this
Court.
12

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY IMPOSED RESTITUTION.
The trial court acted well within its discretion when
it ordered defendant to pay the victim $450.00 in restitution.
See State v. Haston, 811 P.2d 929, 936 (Utah App. 1991), cert.
granted,

P.2d

(Utah 1992); State v. Snvder, 747 P.2d 417,

420 (Utah 1987) (the decision of whether to impose restitution
lies within the discretion of the trial court).

Under Utah law:

When a person is adjudged guilty of
criminal activity which has resulted in
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other
sentence it may impose, the court shall order
that the defendant make restitution up to
double the amount of pecuniary damages to the
victim or victims of the offense of which the
defendant has pleaded guilty, is convicted,
or to the victim of any other criminal
conduct admitted by the defendant to the
sentencing court unless the court in applying
the criteria in Subsection (3)(b) finds that
restitution is inappropriate. Whether the
court determines that restitution is
appropriate or inappropriate, the court shall
make the reasons for the decision a part of
the court record.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(3)(a)(i) (1990) (emphasis added).
Subsection (3)(b) reads as follows:
(b) In determining whether or not to
order restitution, or restitution which is
complete, partial, or nominal, the court
shall take into account:
(i) the financial resources of the
defendant and the burden payment of
restitution will impose, with regard to
the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant
to pay restitution on an installment
basis or on other conditions to be fixed
by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on
the defendant of the payment of
13

restitution and the method of payment;
and
(iv) other circumstances which the
court determines make restitution
inappropriate.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(3)(b) (1990).

Defendant's assertion

that the trial court did not comply with the requirements of the
statute because it failed to make findings with respect to its
reasons for ordering restitution is premised on a
misinterpretation of the statute.

There is no language in the

statute that requires a trial court to enter full formal findings
on the record.

Haston, 811 P.2d at 936.

However, as this Court

also recognized in Haston, "the court must declare reasons within
the statutory framework for awarding or denying restitution.

A

statement in the nature of findings which adequately apprises a
reviewing court of the trial court's reasoning is minimally
required."

Id.
In announcing that it would impose restitution, the

trial court made the following comment:
,f

[T]he Court has the authority to order
restitution in an amount double the claimed
damage. I take your math at face value,
counsel, and find that the actual damage,
when totaling up all of the exhibits5, is in
the neighborhood of $260. I could order
restitution in as much as $520. I do not
find that appropriate. But I do find
restitution appropriate under the facts of
these cases, these circumstances, the
hearings prior to [today] and today. Four

5

The exhibits referred to by the trial court were documents
supporting the victim's valuation of the items damaged by
defendant and the cost of repairs. They are numbered Plaintiff's
Exhibits 1 - 9 and are included in the court record.
14
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basis alone,
See Amicone, 689

Finally, with respect to defendant's assertion that the
trial court did not make any findings with respect to the
criteria identified under subsection (3)(b), the statute itself
requires only that "the court shall take [those factors] into
account."

§ 76-3-201(3)(b).

Although the trial court did not

conduct an inquiry into the various factors, it is apparent that
the court believed defendant would not be burdened by the order
of restitution.

Not only did defendant own the Black Swan

Restaurant, but he had retained private counsel. Moreover,
defendant himself told the court that he owned a piece of
property in Springdale, Utah that was valued at approximately
$200,000 (R. 57 at 6). Consequently, although the court should
have perhaps discussed the factors identified in subsection
(3)(b) more fully on the record, it is reasonable to believe that
the court concluded defendant would not be burdened by an order
to pay $450.00 in restitution.

More importantly, however,

defendant has not even alleged that he was prejudiced by the
trial court's failure to make findings related to § 76-3201(3)(b).

See State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, 1261-62 (Utah

1983) (defendant must contend that error was harmful).
Because there is ample evidence in the record to
support the trial court's restitution judgment, and because
defendant does not contend that the trial court's alleged failure
to consider the factors identified in § 76-3-201(3)(b) prejudiced
his case, this Court should deem any failure on the part of the
trial court to more fully state its reasons for imposing
16

restitution harmless error
otherwise

-

Should this Court conclude

proper remedy

remand the easi-i ! m

c

the ontiy

necessary, farther proceedings
-. of restitutio

Haston, 811 P. 2d at 937,
CONCLUSION

regoing reasons, the trial courts imposition
~* restitution should be affirmed,
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NGTON COUNTY, STAT*

UTAH

STATF
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND RESTITUTION
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

f
Criminal No. 9010016/04
Defendant,
The above-entitled matter ha\
for heard

: befor

Defendant '«. t d i jer r

signed Resti:. _:.. ,

Pi aim iff State of Utah appearing through .•
counsel, Wade Farrawa*.

Deputy Washington Coun*

the Defendant

through 1.. counsel,

Bishop, and the Court having reviewed
records

files and

action, including the rest .

August oi

f

aving heard the arguments

counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, now makes
and enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusion;;, of, h niv:
1.
hearing on Plaintiff's motion

a notice of the original
restitution judgment, which

hearing was held August 30, 1991, a I" hirh h •••; ail no Defendant was
nol preseril , AJU, i hearing, the Court entered a Restitution
Judgment against Defendant in the amount of $281,89.

2.

When no payments on said judgment had been received,

Defendant was served with an Order to Show Cause requiring him to
appear on November 8, 1991, to show cause why payments had not
been made.
3.

At the November 8, 1991, Defendant, who was present

without counsel, requested that the Court set aside the
restitution judgment in the amount of $281.89 and hold another
hearing on the amount of restitution to be paid.
4.

The Court granted Defendant's motion, set aside the

$281.89 judgment, and set a second restitution hearing for
November 13, 1992.
5.

Defendant was present in person at the November 13,

1991, hearing, and at the time of hearing advised the Court that
his attorney could not be present and requested a continuance.
The Court noted that no appearance of counsel had been filed and
denied Defendant's motion for continuance, and the restitution
hearing was held.
6.

At the November 13, 1991, hearing, Phillip Kent

Bimstein, the victim in this action, presented testimony and
written evidence as to the amount of damages caused by Defendant,
which the Court found persuasive.
7.

At the January 8, 1992, hearing, Defendant's counsel

made a proffer of the testimony of Defendant's witness concerning
the cause of the damages for which restitution is sought.

The

Court also admitted a letter from Dale Dockstaker to the
Defendant offered in mitigation of damages to the victim's front
door.

45

8,

The Court determined that a hearing on restitution is a

sentencing proceeding,
. 9.

The t "ourt stated that Rule 1101 of the Utah Rules of

Evidence provides that

sentencing proceedings t h e Rules ox

Evidence are stayed,

be

2 ecei.i e> 3 and considered.
10

The Court determined that

victim, Phillip Kent

Bimstein, suffered a :;t t id,] d< , i iiJiciiyt J s
i

Defendan
1

-«? a

criminal activity.

Tne -

noted that

las authorit

an amount c

... imount of

damages.
CONCLUSIONS OF L A W
1

1.
hearings

v notice of the restitution

action.
Pursuant t o Rule 1101
considered Defendant's proferred evidence

causation and mitigation of d a m a g e s , as well as reviewing
the testimony of Phillip Kent Bimstein < m
making

> 'i

nil

MMI.I

n

r

ruling.

The amount of $450.00 is a reasonable and justifiable
amount of restitution

this m a t t e r .

^regoing Finding!

••r*- and Conclusions of Law,

the Court n o w makes and enters its
RESTITUTION JUDGMENT
HEREBY ORDERED that a restitution judgment is entered
against t h e Defendant, GARY STARNES, and in favor

Bimstein, in the amount of Four Hundred Fifty Dollars ($450.00).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that said restitution shall be paid
through the Washington County Attorney's Office.
DATED this

/ft

day of January, 1992.

JApE^ST. SHUMATE
Dg&RICT COURT JUDGE
CERTIFICATION
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

)
:
)

ss.

I, JAY B. HOLT, Clerk of said District Court in and for
Washington County, State of Utah, do hereby certify that the
Honorable James L. Shumate, whose name is subscribed to the
preceding certificate is the Judge of said Court, duly
commissioned and qualified, and the signature of said Judge to
said Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Restitution
Judgment
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed
the seal of the Court this

day of January, 1992.

JAY B. HOLT, CLERK
By
DEPUTY CLERK

AH*

.•>•• amount of Four Hundred Fifty TV". '

£

; ^ "s ,

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that said restitution shall be paid
through t:

Washington

UL

DATE

e.
rf rr- -

• of January, 1992.

-'JA>1E§X£T.

SHUMATE. v • .;. ,
Yb

**«."

*'"''

-»'V

'* ^' < ?

CERTIFICATION
STATE OF "T.Vr
C

WASHINGTON

ss.
)

I, JAT

sale Distri •

Washingto

r

nereby cert~:

Honorable James

;„G: the

Shumate, whose name * subscribed r.

preceding certificate :s *r-=-- "::•:— * :-* c :,Tcommissi on t'.d ana quai 1 i . .

. • ignature ,

\ "r-:^^* to

said Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Restitution
Judgment
I
the seal

hereunto set my hand and affixed
the Court this

day

January, 1992.

JAY B. HOLT, pLERK

By C
DEPUTY \CL:
Approved as to form and content:

Steri«g^

Willard R. Bishop
Attorney for Defendant
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ADDENDUM B

PLAINTIFFS
EXHIBIT
* &

g

November 13,1991

To whom it may concern:
I billed Phillip Bimstein $125.00 to work on
broken lamps and a broken dining table.
The table was an extendable leaf type and the wooden
extension slides underneath were an antique dovetail construction. 50fo of the slides were shattered and I replaced
them. These slides are not just to accommodate the extension
feature of the table, they are the primary structural
member that holds the table together. One of the table
legs was broken and the surface of the table had some dents
which were obviously recent. Typically on such woodworking
repairs I do the minimum of work because IJm usually afraid
the customer won't understand how long my work takes and
will be shocked by a high bill. I should also mention I
didn't have the time in my schedule to spend more time on the
project. Consequently, the table was just repaired to the
point that it could be uprighted and used. However, the
table's condition is not as good as original and its value
was lessoned considerably by the damage and the addition of
"modern" repair parts.
The damaged lamps I worked on were of a very hightech
design and had some key plastic parts that were damaged. I
attempted to repair them with the addition of some superficial
metal screws however I wouldn't guarantee how long they'll
last. It was impossible to make the lamps as good as they were
originally.

^

^

^

P.O. Box 211

Springdale, UTAH 84767

